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Abstract
Background: Increasing tobacco taxes, and through them, prices, is an effective public health 
strategy to decrease tobacco use. The tobacco industry has developed multiple promotional strat-
egies to undercut these effects; this study assessed promotions directed to wholesalers and re-
tailers and manufacturer price changes that blunt the effects of tax and price increases.
Methods: We reviewed tobacco industry documents and contemporaneous research literature 
dated 1987 to 2016 to identify the nature, extent, and effectiveness of tobacco industry promotions 
and price changes used after state-level tobacco tax increases.
Results: Tobacco companies have created promotions to reduce the effectiveness of tobacco tax 
increases by encouraging established users to purchase tobacco in lower-tax jurisdictions and 
sometimes lowering manufacturer pricing to “undershift” smaller tax increases, so that tobacco 
prices increased by less than the amount of the tax.
Conclusions: Policymakers should address industry efforts to undercut an effective public health 
intervention through regulating minimum prices, limiting tobacco industry promotions, and by 
enacting tax increases that are large, immediate, and result in price increases.
Implications: Tobacco companies view excise tax increases on tobacco products as a critical busi-
ness threat. To keep users from quitting or reducing tobacco use in response to tax increases, they 
have shifted manufacturer pricing and developed specific promotions that encourage customers 
to shop for lower-taxed products. Health authorities should address tobacco industry efforts to 
undercut the effects of taxes by regulating prices and promotions and passing large and imme-
diate tax increases.
Background
Tobacco use is the leading preventable cause of death in the United 
States, accounting for one of five deaths annually.1 An effective 
public health strategy for decreasing tobacco use is the imposition 
of “significant tobacco tax and price increases.”2,3 While increasing 
both taxes and prices are valuable public health goals, increasing 
tobacco taxes may not necessarily increase the prices paid by users 
and reduce consumption.4,5 The tobacco industry has expressed sub-
stantial concern about increased prices, whether caused by taxes or 
inflation, reducing demand and corporate profits.6 In the 1970s the 
tobacco industry limited price increases even though the inflation 
rate was high to maximize youth initiation, because young people 
are price-sensitive and less likely to take up smoking when cigarettes 
become more expensive.6 Reflecting similar concerns, tobacco com-
panies work to undercut the effects of tobacco tax increases on price 
and demand7,8 by implementing price discounts and promotional al-
lowances to retailers, as well as “undershifting” taxes by reducing 
wholesale prices at the same time that taxes increase.9
applyparastyle “fig//caption/p[1]” parastyle “FigCapt”
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The Federal Trade Commission reported that, in 2004 and 2005, 
that the largest share of advertising and promotional spending, over 
77%, was “price discounts … to reduce the price of cigarettes to 
consumers”10; that share increased to 83% and $7.25 billion in 2016 
for cigarettes (62% and $468 million for smokeless tobacco).11–13 
Promotions include: (1) discount coupons to consumers, either 
offered directly or through retailers; (2) price reductions for whole-
salers for larger orders, which may be passed down to the retail level 
(off-invoice discounts); (3) buy-down programs in which retailers 
receive rebates for sales, (4) wholesale pricing agreements in which 
a wholesaler pays a rebate to retailer for sales (paperless coupons); 
and (5) retail value-added (typically buy-one-get-one-free). Most in-
dependent research on tobacco price promotions has focused on a 
few strategies: consumers buying cartons instead of packs for the 
volume discount, switching from “premium” to budget brands, 
direct-to-consumer coupons, and purchases made in lower-tax 
areas.14–21 Tobacco companies appear to increase the distribution of 
consumer-directed price promotions after the implementation of tax 
increases6,22,23; younger, heavy, and “premium” brand smokers are 
more likely to respond.20,24–26
Existing studies have noted the need for research on how the to-
bacco companies use promotions and their effects on tobacco use16,20 
because the intended effects of tax increases may be undercut by re-
cently expanded tobacco industry promotional strategies, including 
the development of new alternative tobacco products.8,18,27 Studies 
of other products for which there is relatively inelastic demand, such 
as gasoline, find that price promotions have been used to mask tax 
increases that would otherwise change purchasing behavior.28 Some 
tax increases, however, appear to be reflected in higher prices: to-
bacco companies responded to the 1983 federal tax increase from 
8¢ to 16¢ by overshifting, increasing prices by more than the tax 
to maintain revenues in the face of declining sales volume.6,29 The 
tobacco industry’s response to much larger state-level tobacco tax 
increases in late 20th and early 21st century30 has not yet been as-
sessed, in part due to limited information about when, where, and 
to what extent tobacco companies have used different promotional 
strategies and the difficulty of identifying industry strategies.
We used internal tobacco industry documents released under legal 
discovery to assess relationships between tobacco industry promotion 
strategies and increased state tobacco taxes to assess industry strat-
egies that are often invisible to outside researchers. Public promo-
tions such as consumer coupons and the creation and promotion of 
discount brands can be tracked using surveillance data,6,10,14–21,31 so 
we concentrated instead on promotions directed to wholesalers and 
retailers and on manufacturer price changes. We anticipated that while 
the tobacco industry approaches price increases in different ways, it 
has integrated its visible (coupons) and invisible (buybacks) promo-
tions in order to reduce the impact of tax increases on consumers.
Methods
We searched the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library,32 
which contains over 14 million related to the industry, between 
January and May 2018 using established snowball methods.33–38 
Original searches focused on keywords (e.g. tax differential, border 
store) combined with delimiters like the names of individual states. 
Searches for a specific term or phrase typically result in hundreds 
or thousands of results, so documents are screened for relevance 
and duplication. We refined the original search terms and dates by 
adding the names of individuals and companies to restrict searches, 
and searching specifically for lobbying reports and marketing cam-
paigns. We also searched nearby documents (using Bates numbers). 
Documents were aggregated into a historical timeline; when mul-
tiple documents made similar claims, documents were summarized. 
Important claims made in the documents have been quoted exactly. 
Following standard practices for tobacco documents research, 
we used triangulation among the available documents and with 
other sources, primarily research literature drawn from PubMed, 
to validate and contextualize the information we found in the 
documents.39,40 Our final analysis included ~90 tobacco industry 
documents and articles dated between 1987 and 2016.
Results
In 1985, a draft of a Philip Morris “discussion document used at the 
meeting of top management”41 explained that “Of all the concerns, 
there is one—taxation—that alarms us the most … [T]axation de-
presses [sales] severely.”42 Tobacco companies have historically re-
sponded to tobacco tax increases by offering consumer promotions 
in the form of coupons, promoting sales in lower-tax outlets and 
lowering wholesale prices.6 The companies track these outcomes to 
assess their marketing effectiveness.
Strategies to Undercut Regional Tax Increases: Tax 
Differential or Border Stores
One way that tobacco users can avoid paying more after a tax increase 
is by purchasing in lower-tax jurisdictions. “Tax differential stores” 
(Lorillard)43 or “border stores” (Philip Morris,44 RJ Reynolds45) are 
high-volume retail tobacco outlets “that attract carton consumers 
from bordering high tax areas.”46 Since at least the 1990s, tobacco 
companies have closely monitored these stores and how easily they 
can be accessed by residents of neighboring states.46–48 Tax differen-
tial stores feature extensive manufacturer promotions49,50 and are ex-
empt from typical display requirements due to the expectation that 
much of the customer-traffic will be drive-through.51 Tax differential 
stores were listed by Lorillard in its internal documents as eligible 
for “niche” promotions that increase store incentives, along with 
“Indian Reservations,”52 if “primary business is by the carton”49 and 
they sold at least 30 cartons per week.53–55
Both Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds direct increased promo-
tions to border stores in lower-tax jurisdictions after tax increases in 
neighboring states, to reduce their already-lower prices.56–58 In 1994, 
Lorillard’s “Buydown” promotions for tax differential stores ranged 
from $1 to $3, depending on brand.53 In 2000, RJ Reynolds drafted 
a letter for New York State retailers to use when lobbying against 
statewide regulation of manufacturer incentives which explained 
that buydowns are “payments made by or on behalf of a manufac-
turer… to reduce the cost of cigarettes to an agent, wholesaler or re-
tailer” that “reduce the cost of cigarettes to consumers.”59 According 
to the letter, retailers preferred buydowns “over coupons because the 
immediate payment … avoids the retailer cash flow problems cre-
ated by the time lag between coupon acceptance and redemption.”59
Industry Claims Made to Lobby Against Tax Increases
The tobacco industry lobbies extensively to prevent significant tobacco 
tax increases.60 In the 1990s, Philip Morris commissioned at least 12 
reports to advocate against proposed state tobacco tax increases.61 
Philip Morris hired the consulting firm InContext Inc., which had 
previously prepared arguments against other tobacco control policies, 
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to assess retail sales on opposite sides of state “tax differential” bor-
ders.62–69 The target audiences included “state legislators”64,66 and 
other “state government policy makers”64–66 as well as “state-wide 
and local media.”64 Although the reports were presented as location-
specific, the same claims were repeated for each region, in some cases 
verbatim.64–66 In every case, InContext claimed that the region under 
review had existing tobacco retailers who were economically vital and 
needed to be protected from competitors in lower-tax neighboring 
states by leaving tobacco taxes at their existing levels.44,64–74 The re-
ports claimed that “retail tax disparities have skewed job, businesses, 
and prosperity… in favor of the low tax state.”64 As planned, these 
reports were subsequently quoted by local media.75–81
These InContext lobbying documents claimed that distance af-
fected users’ ability to take advantage of tax differentials, and specif-
ically in Washington State that “the highest [local] taxes are… where 
distance from [the] border holds those areas harmless from retail sales 
competition.”64 InContext argued that the distance consumers were 
willing to travel increased with the size of the tax differential and 
existing commute and vacation patterns; the distance they proposed 
shoppers were willing to travel increased with every report, from an 
initial 5 miles to 100 miles.64,66,73,82 They further argued that decisions 
to cross tax differential borders for lower-priced cigarettes were “irre-
versible”65 and quoted tax differential store owners who claimed that 
30–95% of their customers were from higher-tax areas.65 Similarly, 
a 1998 lobbying document commissioned by Philip Morris from the 
American Economics Group to argue against a tobacco tax increase 
in New Hampshire estimated that the state’s tax differential stores 
retained sales of over 2 million packs each year from tobacco users 
visiting from surrounding states with higher taxes.83
Internal Industry Analyses of the Actual Effects on 
Tax Differential Store Sales After State Tobacco tax 
increases
In May 1989, New York State implemented a 12 cent per pack tax 
increase (from 21¢ to 33¢), which the Philip Morris Marketing 
Information and Analysis Division estimated reduced their “pre-tax 
increase trend [in sales]” by 1.2% annually as of July 1990.84 The 
same analysis concluded that between 1989 and 1990, 7 states on 
the east coast had increased their tobacco taxes by 3¢ to 12¢ per 
pack (10%–57% of prior prices), nonetheless, “due to differences in 
timing and volume … sales trends for the Region do not exhibit a 
clear impact from the tax increases.”84
In 1993, Massachusetts increased its tobacco tax by 25¢ (from 
26¢ to 51¢).30 InContext’s publicly released reports for Philip Morris 
had estimated that tax differential stores in New Hampshire in-
creased their sales by 11–36%.44 Philip Morris internal Region 1 
(the US Northeast) Monthly Highlights reported that after the 1993 
Massachusetts tax increase, “volume shifts have been observed in 
Southern Vermont retail outlets due to migration of Massachusetts 
smokers across state lines for purchasing purposes” but did not spe-
cify percentages.85 A  sales analysis of Rhode Island border stores 
showed sales increases ranging from 27% to 200%.85 However, 
at the same time, Philip Morris found that cross-border sales to 
Canadians were decreasing due to the Canadian government’s in-
creased enforcement of duty laws.85 A  1994 internal memo for 
Lorillard executives analyzing the 1993 Massachusetts tax effects 
on sales concluded that the tax increase “created a 6% decline [in 
wholesale]” and that “part of the decline in Massachusetts was offset 
by gains in bordering states,”86 although it did not detail how much.
A similar Lorillard memo discussing the 1994 Michigan 50¢ 
(25¢ to 75¢) state tax increase estimated that only 18% of the re-
duced sales in Michigan were “offset by gains in border stores in 
Indiana and Ohio.”87 Four months after the 1994 Michigan tax in-
crease, Philip Morris reported that the company expected sales to 
decrease by 11–13% and found they had decreased by 10%, with 
no shift from “premium” to “discount” brands and despite increased 
sales in neighboring lower tax jurisdictions.88
A study of smokers conducted for Lorillard after Michigan’s 
1994 tax increase found that the company had successfully shifted 
some of its customers to tax differential stores, and that while some 
had quit after the tax increase, those that continued to smoke had 
not reduced their numbers of cigarettes.89 A study conducted for RJ 
Reynolds on sales in Michigan after the same tax increase noted that, 
“Full Price has actually gained share throughout Michigan … this is 
likely due to the Full Price promotions [RJ Reynolds] put in place 
[to] offset the tax increase.”90 Overall, Lorillard reported that des-
pite efforts to convince consumers to shop at lower-tax sales outlets 
“any ‘sizeable’ tax increase in a state [such as Michigan’s] will result 
in a 7% cutback in consumption.”87 The executives concluded that 
given their inability to shift people to purchase tobacco in lower-
tax areas, “in the event of a… tax increase… [we should] offset our 
share of a consumption decline by taking [volume] away from our 
competition.”87 In 1996 RJ Reynolds conducted a phone-interview 
survey of 1,856 smokers through Woeflel Research to assess “cigar-
ette outlets,” (including border stores) which represented “10% of 
industry volume” and consumed 28 % of [all industry] promotional 
support.45 The study determined that consumers who used outlet 
stores were older and less educated, and driven by price—85% pur-
chased by carton rather than by pack.45
Price promotions became more critical to the industry after 
the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement ended many traditional 
marketing strategies such as advertising on billboards.91 In 2000, 
New York State increased its tobacco tax by 55¢ ($0.56 to $1.11). 
Two months later Lorillard executives stated that “Native American” 
store sales in New York had increased by over 50%.92 While there 
are reports of smuggling after tax increases that reduces consumer 
costs,93 the Lorillard internal analysis reported no smuggling and 
that border stores saw no change in sales.92 In a letter drafted for 
retailers to send to state regulators by RJ Reynolds, the company 
complained the New York tax increase was problematic because 
the New York Department of Taxation and Finance had decided 
to prohibit all buydowns, limiting tobacco companies’ ability to 
undercut the tax increase.59 In the 1990s, tobacco industry reports 
created to lobby state policymakers had claimed that users would 
travel extreme distances to purchase tobacco in lower-tax neigh-
boring states.44,64–74 In contrast, Lorillard found that in 2000, after 
California passed a 50¢ tax increase (37 to 87¢) and the federal to-
bacco tax increased by 10¢, California tobacco users did not travel 
to lower-tax neighboring states.94
In summary, the tobacco industry publicly predicted that to-
bacco tax increases would lead to smuggling across state lines and 
users making a permanent choice to purchase tobacco in lower-
tax jurisdictions. In contrast, internal documents the companies 
recognized that tobacco tax increases did not result in smuggling 
and that efforts to convince users to purchase in lower-tax jur-
isdictions were less successful than intended. Independent ana-
lyses found that those tobacco users who initially shifted their 
purchases to lower-tax jurisdictions became less willing to do so 
over time.
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Company Pricing Responses to Tax Increases: 
Undershifting and Overshifting
In the wake of a tax increase, tobacco manufacturers have choices 
about how to change prices. Smokers can bear the full cost of the 
tax so that the price per pack increases by the amount of the tax, the 
companies can “undershift” the tax by cutting wholesale prices so 
that the total retail price increases by less than the amount of the tax 
to buffer the effect of the tax increase on consumers, or the tax can 
be “overshifted” so that the price increases by more than the amount 
of the tax in order to maintain company cash flow (and profits) in 
the face of the consumption decline caused by the price increase. 
After the 1983 US federal tax doubled from 8¢ to 16¢, tobacco com-
panies overshifted, raising prices by more than the amount of the 
tax which masked the source of the simultaneous wholesale price in-
crease to consumers.29 Four years later, an executive memo at Philip 
Morris discussing how to respond to tobacco tax increases explained 
that, “the [US] 1982–83 round of price increases [when the company 
raised prices more than the tax increases] caused two million adults 
to quit smoking and prevented 600,000 teenagers from starting to 
smoke … We don’t need to have that happen again.”95 Despite this 
concern, tobacco companies have taken varying pricing approaches 
in response to increased taxes.
Tobacco taxes as a percentage of existing prices have increased 
over time in the US: increases averaged 35% in the 1980s, 48% in 
the 1990s, and 114% from 2000 to 2014.30 Throughout the 1990s, 
states mostly increased their tobacco taxes by a few cents per pack, 
but between 2000 and 2016, 11 states increased their tobacco taxes 
by more than $1 in a single year.30 Other states substantially in-
creased taxes over multiple years: between 2002 and 2012 Hawaii’s 
tobacco tax increased from $1 per pack to $3.20 per pack and be-
tween 2005 and 2014 Minnesota’s tobacco tax increased from 48¢ 
per pack to $3.34 per pack.30 Localities have imposed steep increases 
as well; Cook County, IL raised its tobacco tax by $1 in 2012 to $3, 
and NYC set a minimum pack price of $13 in 2018.
In 1994, Michigan increased its tax by 50¢ (200% increase, 
from 25¢ to 75¢ per pack). This tax appears to have been passed on 
unchanged; a sales report from Philip Morris explained that while 
the company had initially planned to change its pricing by not only 
passing on the full tax, but adding a “25% margin” it ultimately 
chose not to overshift, although no explanation for the decision was 
provided.88 Its choice was consistent with those of other tobacco 
companies; an RJ Reynolds sales report summarized that “Effective 
May 1, 1994, Michigan increased its excise tax on cigarettes by 50¢ 
a pack… From a review of retail prices, it appears that retailers con-
tinue to pass the full 50¢ tax on to consumers.”90
A modification of undershifting taxes is to make them less vis-
ible by sandwiching manufacturer price increases between relatively 
small tax increases. New Hampshire price increases provide an ex-
ample. In 1999 the state increased its tobacco tax by 15¢ (60% 
increase, from 25¢ to 37¢). RJ Reynolds responded by increasing 
wholesale prices by smaller amounts in subsequent years; the manu-
facturer price increase was 45¢ in 1998, then 18¢ in 1999 when the 
state tobacco tax increased by 15¢ (for a total increase of 33¢,) then 
13¢ in 2000 when the federal tobacco tax increased by 10¢ (for a 
total increase of 23¢).96
Undershifting taxes by modifying manufacturer price increases 
appears more difficult for tobacco companies when tax increases 
are higher. In 1999, California increased its state tobacco tax by 
50¢ (135% increase, from 37¢ to 87¢) and in 2000, the federal to-
bacco tax increased by 10¢ (from 24¢ to 34¢ per pack). Lorillard 
found that when the combined federal and California state tax in-
creases were passed on to consumers sales dropped (Figure 1).94 
In 2014, Minnesota increased its tobacco tax by $1.74 (109% in-
crease, from $1.60 to $3.34);30 contemporaneous independent re-
search found that retail prices overshifted in response, increasing 
by $1.89.22
Discussion
Consistent with previous research,97,98 the internal documents that 
we examined indicate that tobacco companies attempt to reduce the 
public health benefits of tobacco increases. Industry strategies extend 
beyond previously described14–21 coupons provided to consumers 
and the creation of discount brands into efforts to modify shopping 
patterns by promoting sales in tax differential or border stores, and 
shifting manufacturer pricing.
Figure 1. Lorillard’s California sales volume report after a 45¢ federal tax increase followed immediately by a 50¢ California tax increase.94 
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Lobbying documents produced by the tobacco industry argue 
that tax increases are ineffective because retailers will smuggle to-
bacco into high-tax areas and consumers will travel to lower-tax jur-
isdictions to purchase them. The companies’ internal sales reports in 
the wake of tobacco tax increases reveal that these claims are signifi-
cantly overstated: none of the industry’s internal reports following 
the tax increase found evidence of smuggling after tax increases. 
Tobacco companies have, however, devoted extensive efforts to con-
vincing consumers to travel to lower-tax jurisdictions, including 
border store specific promotions. Our findings drawn from tobacco 
industry sales reports suggest that promotions focused on border 
stores have partially undercut the use of tobacco taxes intended 
to increase prices by encouraging some users to purchase tobacco 
across state lines. Reports commissioned by the tobacco industry 
provide inconsistent expectations regarding how far consumers 
might be expected to travel, ranging from 5 to 100 miles; given that 
these reports were intended for lobbying, the actual distance users 
are willing to travel remains unclear.44,64–74
Although the willingness of tobacco users to travel to lower-tax 
jurisdictions appears to decline over time, public health regulators 
could make tobacco tax increases more effective in the short term. 
New York’s decision to eliminate buydowns made it more difficult 
to undercut the state’s 2000 tobacco tax increase and Canadian en-
forcement of duty on tobacco purchases made in the United States 
reduced cross-border sales. Seven years after the New York tax in-
crease, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
concluded that initial tax-avoidant purchases (i.e. residents crossing 
to lower-tax jurisdictions) in New York dropped after 2 years, but 
tobacco company discounts had undercut the new tax, so that the 
32% price increase that would have occurred had the full cost of 
the tax been passed through to consumers without discounts was a 
20% increase in practice.4 A  contemporaneous independent study 
using scanner sales data found that retail promotions were tar-
geted to high tax areas had similar effects: tobacco industry efforts 
to undercut price increases following tax increases were not fully 
realized in higher prices and promoted sales were increasing over 
time.99 Similarly, public health researchers suggest using minimum 
price laws to limit the effects of price promotions.97,98,100,101 These 
interventions also have the potential to reduce coupon use.
In addition to promoting border store sales, tobacco companies 
have modified manufacturer wholesale prices to undercut the ef-
fects of higher taxes that were intended to increase prices and re-
duce prevalence. Research on alcohol taxes suggests that only some 
increases are completely passed on to consumers.102 When tax 
increases are small, alcohol sellers undershift the tax and do not in-
crease prices; in the face of small tax increases, alcohol prices are 
“sticky,” or resistant to change.102 When tax increases are large, al-
cohol sellers overshift the tax, increasing retail prices by more than 
the amount of the tax.102 Our results suggest that tobacco manu-
facturers behave similarly to alcohol manufacturers in that they 
undershift smaller tax increases and overshift larger tax increases. 
Independent research in the UK found that tobacco companies also 
undershifted discount brands and overshifted higher price brands 
after tax increases.97,98 Taken together these findings suggest that 
passing large tax increases that take effect immediately will reduce 
tobacco use more than spreading smaller tax increases over a longer 
time. A recent complication is the rapid development of new non-
cigarette tobacco products that are taxed at lower rates, leading con-
sumers to substitute: expanding excise taxes to all tobacco products 
is also critical to reducing consumption.27
Limitations
Tobacco industry documents, by their nature, provide incomplete in-
formation about corporate activity. Some potentially relevant docu-
ments were marked as confidential or privileged communication; 
tobacco companies use these claims as a strategy to avoid making 
internal documents public.103,104 While our findings suggest that to-
bacco companies deliberately target promotions and price changes 
to limit the effect of taxes on tobacco use, this is not necessarily the 
case for every promotion or pricing change after a tax increase. There 
is limited research on the distribution of promotions and changes in 
pricing before and after tax increases; future studies that track and 
archive these data would be useful to both regulators and researchers.
Public Health Implications
There has been little public health research on the ways that tobacco 
companies use “invisible” strategies to promote tobacco products in 
the wake of tax increases. Internal tobacco industry documents sug-
gest that tobacco companies have found strategies to partially blunt 
the effects of tax increases that were intended to increase prices and 
reduce the prevalence of tobacco use. Tobacco companies have used 
promotions directed at retail stores near the borders of states with 
tax differentials (and Tribal Lands)52 to encourage users, particu-
larly those near lower-tax jurisdictions, to purchase where taxes are 
lower, reducing the cost of use. Similarly, they have changed manu-
facturer pricing to hide tax increases that take effect over time from 
consumers. Policymakers should address these efforts to undercut 
public health interventions by implementing minimum pricing re-
strictions97,98,100,101 as well as regulating tobacco industry promotions 
to wholesalers and retailers and passing tax increases that are large, 
immediate, and cover all tobacco products.
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